Petr Yan vs. Jimmie Rivera: Siege of the Cage
Photo by Jeff Bottari/Zuffa LLC/Zuffa LLC via Getty Images
This article is a republished, rewritten and reworked version of a previous work done on the author’s personal blog.
Introduction
UFC 238 remains one of the more underrated cards in recent memory and a showcase for the many elite fighters of arguably the UFC’s most competitive weight class, bantamweight. Henry Cejudo, after his heels were smashed by the sledgehammer kicks of Marlon Moraes, rallied his way to a sensational victory to become a two-weight divisional champion. That same night, fellow bantamweight contender Aljamain Sterling maintained an outfighting volume game against a dangerous, opportunistic Pedro Munhoz in another brilliant contest. Still, on a night that showcased exactly why many, including myself, hold such reverence for the Bantamweight division, the standout fight may have been between Petr Yan and Jimmie Rivera. Over the course of fifteen minutes, both fighters would engage in a battle of adjustments and wits to maintain their control of the fight in one of the finest technical showdowns of 2019.
Petr Yan, since his breakout in an absolute barnburner all-time classic against Magomed Magomedov in the ACA/ACB, has emerged as one of the most promising fighters in the entire sport. With a gift for pressure, tremendous wrestling, a vicious clinch game, and as one of MMA’s savviest boxers, Yan was the complete package and has been able to prove himself the better fighter against everyone he has stepped in the cage with. Although Yan can be caught in exchanges and scrambles and does rely upon a physical edge, he’s still defensively-aware enough to avoid a vast majority of those situations. Furthermore, no one has come out of a fight with him unscathed – usually they get dropped, knocked out, hurt and bloodied; ‘No Mercy’ is an epithet that befits Yan’s in-cage results.
Jimmie Rivera, by contrast, is a fighter I’ve struggled to really understand, yet whose recent dismissal from the UFC undermines how good a fighter he was. A skilled pocket boxer with a knack for counter punching and power, Rivera seemed more content to try and outfight many of his opponents and control them than engage strictly within his domain. This has led to my assumption that he’s somewhat inconsistent as a fighter in terms of strategic and tactical successes, but it’s just as plausible that Rivera himself is extremely matchup dependent and that his ability to win fights may be best determined by how well he can align his tools around what an opponent can offer him. In other words, Rivera seems to struggle with closing the distance to enforce a pressure game or to engage in the pocket battles that he wants to have if the opponent isn’t inclined to be drawn into his preferred range. Moreover, although he has a decent toolbox, he will struggle to adapt midfight beyond what his abilities allow. In essence, he’s limited to certain areas of a fight and struggles with broader, strategic. But, when he was on, Rivera was a tough out for anyone who engaged with him on his terms.
And, over the course of fifteen minutes, Rivera did manage to put all of what he could do together and would force the future top bantamweight of the world to have to adapt to every single layer and adjustment that Rivera could do to earn a win.
The Wall
Conventional wisdom is that, despite Rivera being a competent pocket-boxer himself, to engage with an offensively-gifted Yan in extended pocket battles or to concede the section of the cage where the fight would take place would be to Rivera’s detriment. Therefore, Rivera’s goal for the entirety of the fight was simple: Negate Yan’s pressure and draw him into shorter pocket exchanges where Rivera could get the better of them.
Proactive and reactive upper-body movement mixed with an abundance of feints – primarily level-change feints – were done to keep Yan at bay with the threat of actual offense. In the interim, Rivera would look to control the fight’s rhythm with his jab.
These threats were delivered in full, particularly in the second round where Rivera began to stand his ground more, with initiative entries as Yan would stop and plant in anticipation of the exchange. As soon as Yan did so, Rivera would break rhythm and time him with a strike before Yan could set his own.
Yan’s defensive instincts are incredibly precise, though his high guard can be drawn consistently with enough potency. Rivera took advantage of that and would attack between the body and head to keep Yan covering up and not look for counters.
Threats are only as effective as their delivery and Rivera understood that he had to keep Yan out of engagements by being proactive about timing his shots and breaking rhythm to close the door on Yan.
See that jab and see how it and the feints preoccupy Yan’s attention?
Because Yan had to be cautious with his entries into the pocket, that allowed Rivera to attack from distance. Due to his low, crouched base, Rivera could deliver kicks at a greater range as opposed to what Yan’s more conventional, upright stance could hit and could target the calf to limit Yan’s mobility or as a punish if Yan tried to jab. This kind of stance lends itself well to boxing exchanges because it allows Rivera to deliver power punches whilst maintaining defense in punching exchanges. Ergo, when Rivera did commit to his offense, he had the power to threaten and hurt Yan in both the pocket and at range even if the stance itself wasn’t the best for kick utility. By mixing in jabs to mess with rhythm then, Rivera really began a concentrated attack on Yan’s feet.
Yan, an avid kick-checker and cross-checks, is only made vulnerable here because Rivera has established such a potent pocket threat and is pairing it with his ancillary skills.
Let’s suppose Yan did manage to pressure Rivera to the cage, however? That situation presents two problems: One, the lack of space and, two, the threat of one of the most offensively-versatile clinch games in MMA. How Rivera dealt with these involved head movement, footwork and smothering into the clinch.
Head movement, specifically weaves, allowed Rivera to get out after he drew Yan in by, after dodging Yan’s main strike to circle out and return to the center. Weaving in particular is useful to draw a straight line of attack and to take a different angle because the upper body is already in motion. It can also be more preferable to slipping if the idea is to not engage.
Rivera also liked to slip, dip or weave under Yan’s strikes to get inside and grab the clinch (Remember? Take a different angle?). In theory, entering the clinch versus Yan was a danger zone because the Russian immediately looks for wrist control, but Rivera and his team had decided, like the striking exchanges, that they would dictate when it would begin and end. Rivera would grip Yan’s gloves, use underhooks and turn him while using his open glove (assuming Yan was not controlling it) to hit and then break before Yan could establish a better position in the clinch.
Sometimes Rivera would even use entries into the pocket to enter the clinch to smother Yan’s forward offense and hit off the breaks.
To that end, the Tiger Shulmman product had presented a variety of defensive preparation for what Yan could bring to a fight and had shown clear ways of nullifying most of Yan’s tools to dictate the terms on which the fight would be fought. Consequently, with a layered defense in front of him, like most good conquerors, Petr Yan sought to lay a meticulous, lethal series of strikes through to smash Rivera’s skull into a state of the unconscious.
Breaking Through
Suffice it to say, Petr Yan’s pressure game is one of the most refined you would find in MMA right now.
With the use of small lateral steps and constant probing feints with the lead hand, Yan can quickly establish threats to push his opponents into space where they can do very little. It’s a testament to Yan’s preternatural affinity as a pressure fighter, then, that, even with Rivera’s many efforts, Yan still got him to the fence consistently.
The problems Yan did have, however, were that Rivera’s work was denying him his pocket entries and his leg was taking damage. Because Rivera was denying the same consistent pace and overwhelming offense that saw many others beaten down, Yan switched his strategy around: If he couldn’t make every moment his, then he' would craft the biggest, most damaging moments of the fight; if he couldn’t finish Rivera, then he’d at least focusing on hurting him enough.
And Yan, arguably MMA’s premier tactician, went to work.
The main tool Yan used was his lead hand. With throwaways, feints and jabs, Yan was looking to set the expectation of the right hand up in Rivera’s head. This would allow him to chain together other offense or transition into the clinch (sometimes, he would also use throwaway rights to transition too – e.g. the liver left hook or the transition into the clinch elbow). He also made sure that, when he got Rivera to the fence, he didn’t simply close the distance immediately: Instead, he looked to keep Rivera there consistently if he could.
However, it simply was not just the right hand. It was about getting Rivera back into the fence and to hit him with a kill shot once they were there. Ultimately, Yan had conceded that, until he could figure out how to control pocket exchanges on his terms in open space, he would need to enforce his own main game that was working – Rivera was easy enough to get to the fence, so Yan just needed to punish him while he was there within that interval.
Yan’s shifts are often used to attack the opponent in combination in the pocket consistently. Against an opponent who is dedicated to not have longer exchanges, Yan’s shifts became a way to get space back. But the Russian adjusted here: The 1-2 into a shifting 2 doesn’t work? No problem. Shift quicker and time this lateral movement with an overhand left for a knockdown by setting the expectation that’s coming down the centerline.
Rivera’s kicks became a specific issue in the second round and, alongside an effort to handfight Yan’s lead hand, the Russian had to, again, refocus his efforts. Although the switch to Southpaw had seemed like a reaction to the damage to the left leg, Yan had actually discovered a utility to stop Rivera’s leg kicks: Handfighting and pressure from the southpaw stance.
Hint: Watch the lead leg feints and the body shot stuff. This is super important in a bit.
He could also threaten to teep, use an oblique kick or check due to the distance Rivera’s rear leg would have to cover. This triple threat lowkey stopped Rivera from kicking with regularity and would force more pocket interactions. Rivera needed to plant and have accessible distance to kick and collapsing that distance cut down on Rivera’s ability to stick in one place as the outfighter.
Rivera’s dedication to handfighting Yan’s lead hand in either stance also went from hindrance to an opportunity for the Russian. Because Rivera was used to the lead hand acting as a bridge to Yan’s other offense, he had decided that he could deny Yan’s lead hand and choose to smother or weave out of the pocket depending upon what offense Yan used off of it.
Naturally, Rivera’s willingness to engage with Yan there just opened up more body shots because Rivera’s attention was taken in by the lead hand. If Rivera wanted to kick, he needed space and the handfight would prevent him from doing so.
Yan then began to use the lead leg feints and the handfight to set up more body shots – either a left straight or a left body kick. In turn, this meant that it would easier for Yan to target Rivera upstairs once he get him into the fence. Ergo, the body shots set the expectation. The lead leg feinting offered more of a threat. Then, with all of these little tools in play: Yan nearly sent Rivera’s jaw through the roof.
Please consult the previous few clips, watch the lead hand feints, the lead foot feints and the small little threat of the level change (where Rivera’s lead hand is). And then Yan throws, knocks the rear hand out of the way and breaks Rivera’s jaw open. It’s all about misdirection and that Rivera doesn’t know which way is safe.
And guess what? It almost happened again.
What, you want to escape? Handfighting and cagecutting. Oh I missed a knee/headkick off the same setup? No problem, you’re still trapped.
Everything Yan has done here had made it easier to push Rivera to the fence, but, even worse: Keep him pinned there. You may remember that Rivera had been weaving to escape the fence. The handfight did draw Rivera’s attention and the body shots and kicks made weaving somewhat obsolete.
Regardless, Yan did have an answer for when Rivera did weave.
The threat of Yan’s feints and body attack stifles a lot of Rivera’s efforts. Here, he’s not committed to weaving as much, so tries to gain some control by handfighting the lead hand. Big mistake. Yan does not commit to the handfight, feints a level change to make Rivera try to dip or weave. Then a collar tie behind Rivera’s head makes his dip run straight into an uppercut and a follow up right cross decks him. Petr Yan’s adjustment was to draw the attention with handfight, increase feints without overcommitting and punish Rivera. That is how you transition your strikes into the clinch and vice versa.
Final Stand
At this point, the underpinnings of Rivera’s gameplan were not enough to get the job done and had been meticulously taken apart. With the fence to his back being the equivalent of a death sentence, he turned the contest into an actual fight.
Instead of handfighting simply to deny Yan, Rivera looked to draw him in and break rhythm to be first and last in pocket exchanges.
E.g. Playing off Yan’s attempts to draw the handfight, Rivera plants, jabs down the centerline to open up a right straight.
Likewise, when Yan did step in, Rivera would fire out combinations to make Yan back out or use the same weave-into the clinch and fire tactic from the first few rounds. If the slower pace was not benefiting Yan, then if it needed to at a high-pace, Rivera chose to weaponize it.
The problem for Rivera, however, became apparent: This choice was not really an adjustment as much as it was a last resort. Although Rivera was doing an impeccable job in the pocket exchanges, he was not taking away Yan’s weapons in the same vein as Yan had his. To throw with heat meant that Rivera’s shot selection was less precise and that the opponent could simply cover up or, in Yan’s case, be willing to compete in a physical, exchange-heavy fight. Rivera could not completely dictate the exchanges that he had wanted earlier, especially against an incredibly pocket-savvy fighter in Yan. If anything, this final stand outlined that Rivera was an exceptionally good fighter within the realm of what he could do, but if he had to go beyond what his toolbox would allow for strategically and tactically, he was not entirely capable of passing that test.
For what it is worth though, Rivera put on an excellent showing in this round, but his opponent did in turn.
Notice how Yan is guarding, countering and turning in the exchanges to try and punctuate them? Again, the difference between them is adaptability. Rivera wanted a fight? Then, that meant longer exchanges could happen.
Concluding Thoughts
Petr Yan vs Jimmie Rivera was a fantastic contest between two clever striking technicians that, despite my criticisms of the latter fighter, was an exceptional demonstration of two contrasting styles looking to impose and implement their abilities to the greatest threshold of success versus one another. I am genuinely not sure how many fighters at bantamweight are capable of engaging Petr Yan in the pocket and can have the same kind of consistent success as Rivera (and later, Aldo) did. It must be said that Yan had to earn every success he got. In a sport where the loser is often denigrated as a worthless also-ran, Rivera’s effort here did constitute how good of a fighter he is. Likewise, to beat an opponent like Rivera and have to cater his strategy while still needing to alter defensive and offensive priorities? Petr Yan is an exceptional fighter himself and is highly touted for a reason. His eventual victory over Jose Aldo only solidified and exemplifies that even more.
This weekend, Petr Yan engages fellow violence artist Cory Sandhagen in what promises to be an incredibly entertaining scrap. Sandhagen may well be one of the few fighters on the roster with the adaptability, toughness, and endurance to engage Yan over the course of five rounds, though there are extremely worrying circumstances for the Colorado native. Above all else, Sandhagen’s own willingness to concede range on the backfoot may well be a death sentence against someone with the eye for detail and willingness to punish small mistakes as Yan does. I don’t personally think Sandhagen should be counted out here, though I would need to see more from him to favor him against the man who may well be the best fighter in the world right now.
Thanks for reading.