Mike McCallum vs Sumbu Kalambay II: Best of a Generation
The Loss
Within the annals of combat sports, records are viewed as a sacred measurement for evaluating fighter ability and success. Because combat sports revolve around individual competitions, it’s understandable why wins and losses matter so much. Even though there is an issue whereupon it’s forgotten whom the fighter fought and why the context of that fight matters, you cannot strictly diminish the significance of winning and losing, especially in how it affects the fighters themselves. The very point of competitive sports is to win - and the consequences of losing often serve as the equivalent of having to start from scratch and redo a step. And, even if they don’t have to take that step again, the disappointment is real. Ultimately, anyone who loses wants to get one back.
By 1991, WBA middleweight titleholder Mike McCallum had suffered only one defeat in a bout that was far from close. Over the course of twelve rounds, a superb outfighting performance played havoc on McCallum’s expectations. He was never close to being knocked out, but McCallum could not establish momentum beyond one punch at a time; he was thoroughly humiliated and schooled by one of his division’s hidden prodigies, Sumbu Kalambay. Now, nearly three years removed, McCallum found himself facing Kalambay in Monte Carlo’s Stade Louis II, looking for his revenge.
Between that time, things had changed. McCallum had gone on a tear, besting some exceptionally difficult pugilists and finding himself the titleholder of Kalambay’s belt. Kalambay bested Robbie Sims and gave an outmatched Doug DeWitt a beating, but then he found himself on the receiving end of the greatest win of Michael Nunn’s career. In what remains an anomaly, Kalambay was knocked by a left counter on the centerline - the only knockout loss of his whole career. Nunn was no special puncher, but he threw the finest punch of his life that night. Kalambay worked himself back up though, motivated to win a title back. A former, defeated foe stood in his wake.
With both men driven by hunger and loss, the stage was set for one of the greatest fights the boxing ring would ever see.
Before proceeding any further, I would recommend reading my breakdown of the first contest between these two here.
Vengeance is Best Served Cold
Mike McCallum learned his lesson: To beat Kalambay, persistence alone was not enough; he needed to ensure that he had the ring generalship to control Kalambay. It would require the most disciplined fight of McCallum’s career in ways all of his others beforehand simply didn’t. With arguably boxing’s greatest coach at his side, the legendary Eddie Futch, McCallum proved from the opening bell to the final exchange that he was not here to play.
McCallum is in the black trunks. Kalambay is in white with red stripes.
The greatest issue of McCallum’s game was that he lacked the footwork to keep up with Kalambay. While this is not particularly damning due to the former champion’s mastery of the outside game, McCallum needed to have the lateral movement to cut Kalambay off. This time, there was nothing overaggressive about McCallum’s new pressure here - it was practical, methodical, and consistent.
Effective ringcutting involves understanding that you don’t need to take enormous steps to meet your opponent; rather, by taking a small step or pivot, you meet their movement instead of following them or have to reset your feet consistently. One noticeable trait of good ringcutters is how they can operate at a longer range. These fighters do not need to threaten their opponent with proximity alone, they just need to make them overthink which places are safe to be in. The goal of a good ringcutter is control.
With McCallum, he recognized that he had a reach advantage over Kalambay - that, because he was coming forward, the latter had to either play the matador or take a risk and step in. Because McCallum was no longer following Kalambay into counters, he could assess Kalambay at distance, cut him off and then pin him. The onus was now on Kalambay, with his two options, to figure out how to navigate this new dynamic while McCallum kept his momentum going.
Of course, McCallum still had to contend with a rarity: That Kalambay was one of the few fighters with a comparable (and sometimes even better) lead hand than himself. However, Kalambay himself had already given McCallum the answer from their last meeting: In a duel of lead hands, the person who controls the positioning and punishes the other’s initiative will win. McCallum already was seizing control of the ring, now he could act and build behind his own jab - touching Kalambay at range while leaving him less space. Because Kalambay stood in a more compact stance with his hands closer to his body, his range was shorter than McCallum’s and he would need to step in for his jab to connect.
McCallum then endeavored to nullify Kalambay’s jab. Because Kalambay had less room to move, he was forced to stand his ground. When Kalambay jabbed, McCallum’s rear hand would catch the jab and use that moment as a trigger to counter jab.
Kalambay eventually had to step in to establish some momentum and was quickly reminded of why he looked to avoid any inside exchanges with McCallum in their first meeting.
But McCallum had more than just his trademark body attack. He had preset counters for Kalambay prepared. The Italian native preferred to create his entries behind his jab while dipping, but he had to step in on the taller champion to do so; therefore, McCallum chose to pull and blast Kalambay with an uppercut as the latter made his entry.
Eventually, the former champion found himself backed into the ropes, where he realized that was an even worse place to be.
In their first meeting, Kalambay would take advantage of McCallum’s close pursuit to escape being trapped, but he didn’t have that luxury here. Now, he had to shell up. Kalambay’s cross-arm defense behind shoulder rolls and upper body movement would make any pugilist struggle to find an opening, but McCallum had his man scouted.
Cross-arm guards typically cover the front side of the body whilst the rear hand is posted near the forehead in case the shoulder defenses fail. McCallum would touch with lesser shots, such as his jab to manipulate Kalambay’s guard and force him to cover up. Once he did so, Kalambay’s lead side was exposed for a short right to the body. If he attempted to shift around, he risked opening his rear side up to McCallum’s left hook.
Kalambay’s defense on the ropes still held up regardless, but being pinned there was an enormous dilemma.
Returning to the topic of threats, there are several important subtleties McCallum accomplishes with the above while remaining cognizant of what Kalambay can offer at any time. I already pointed out the distance McCallum operated at and why, but it’s equally important to note that McCallum never stops feinting. Whether it be the aforementioned series of counters or directional half-steps, McCallum showed that he understood that, when confronted by such a mobile, active feinter, you cannot fall into their rhythm - you enforce your own. Ostensibly, when overviewing McCallum’s gameplan, the number of actions made is quite low. However, why McCallum is successful is because each tactic was allocated to target and respond to Kalambay when they actually mattered. Let’s review this relationship of action-reaction:
Kalambay wants to move laterally - McCallum cuts him off at distance.
Kalambay wants to jab - McCallum jabs back or threatens with the cross counter.
Kalambay wants to step in - McCallum has preset counters ready.
Kalambay is passive - McCallum continues to feint, pressure, and so on.
Kalambay feints - McCallum maintains his distance, continues feinting himself, presses and cuts the ring.
The best fighters recognize what their opponent offers them and coordinate responses to ensure they are rendered ineffective. Once they do so, they can build upon their own successes and become more potent. In other words, depth isn’t necessarily dictated by how many things a fighter does; rather, it’s how much they can do with each of their weapons. The greatest ring generals epitomize this principle - and I struggle to think of any examples where Mike McCallum demonstrated his knowledge and depth better than he did here.
E.g. Even when Kalambay was attempting to break through McCallum’s defenses, the latter’s gameplan was flexible enough to adjust. In the first clip, Kalambay attempts to keep the jab battle going to set up the right. In the second clip, less than half a minute later, McCallum choses to pivot away from the jab battle to keep his lead hand in charge.
To paraphrase, Kalambay is now trapped: The corners and ropes are too dangerous and McCallum has command of the distance. Kalambay no longer has a choice; it’s a necessity to come forward as much as possible.
And yet, Kalambay still was far from done. He had taught McCallum a lesson that was being turned back on him. But one of boxing’s most underrated ring wizards still had a few tricks up his sleeve.
The Cornered Fox
With his only real choice being restricted to taking risks, Kalambay conceded that he had to get to work even if it meant being too close to the fire. It was here that Kalambay realized that McCallum’s gameplan, as well executed as it was, had one flaw: Much of what McCallum was doing was in response to what Kalambay was doing. In other words, McCallum was seizing the initiative consistently, but he was also deliberately giving Kalambay some allowances in order to punish him for them immediately.
It takes a second to see what the problem was, but: Kalambay had too much depth to his game to be completely pinned down and McCallum knew it, so the latter narrowed his focus to set responses to set actions. But that means that not every option Kalambay has is shut down. And inch by inch, someone with Kalambay’s craft could turn those marginal differences into enormous yields.
Kalambay’s lead hand had shown its handiwork in their previous fight, but I would argue that its true versatility was demonstrated here. McCallum had chosen set ranges to operate? Then Kalambay could still afford to jab, at the very least, to measure and feel his way with range. Once he could do that, he began to manipulate McCallum’s timings and triggers in numerous ways.
A jab may well be the best rhythm-manipulation tool in the entirety of striking-centric pugilism because the depth of its utility is virtually unmatched. Part of that is because most strikes have limitations upon where they can hit and how quickly they can be used. The jab, while punishable if used in too much excess, can be used on any singular target for different effect at almost any time.
To simplify, Kalambay here jabs at any and every part of McCallum that he can to experiment with rhythm. He changes levels between body and head; he jabs at McCallum’s chest to change his forearm placement; he jabs in open air to keep distance or while moving; he even jabs at McCallum’s rear hand on purpose to draw the counters out.
Subsequently, Kalambay attempted to keep McCallum circling like he had in their previous bout as much as possible. One way to deal with a ringcutter is to keep them following or turning. With McCallum’s commitment to outjabbing Kalambay, the latter could keep the former trapped in the same circular jabbing exchanges until he could break the pattern and find his moments.
But the tactics from said first fight were not going to be enough to fully disable McCallum’s new ring generalship. Kalambay had to tighten up his footwork in some way. With his jab already putting in the work keeping McCallum guessing, he paired it with misdirections to force McCallum to reset and follow instead of acting cutting him off.
Kalambay adamantly never stopped jabbing with McCallum even at the risk of a counter. Eventually, he could identify the danger zones for said counters and when they were coming.
With everything Kalambay has done here, he starts overloading McCallum with data. McCallum now is concerned with the expectations of what Kalambay can do, which dulls the timing on his counters and mitigates the effectiveness of his pressure. And that’s when Kalambay lets his offense flow.
In this compilation, watch how Kalambay’s aforementioned tactics keep McCallum reactive and then drawn into the dynamics Kalambay wants - then Kalambay executes a surprise offense.
However, Kalambay found that he could never escape being cut off completely. But, a level change in response to McCallum’s jab gave him the answer that he needed.
In a closed stance matchup, one way to step inside on your opponent is an outside slip off of their jab. Kalambay discovered he could time McCallum’s with a short right to the body.
The step-in short right wasn’t simply just meaningful offense, it let Kalambay have an answer to McCallum’s inside work. Because he stepped in with the right, Kalambay could posit his right shoulder adjacent to McCallum’s chest and place his head under McCallum’s to break his posture or to smother him in a clinch. Invaluably, this managed to shut down McCallum’s offense when Kalambay had his back to the ropes.
Kalambay also found offensive potency off of his smothering tactics: Namely, by using the overhand right instead of the short right, he could catch McCallum on entry just as much as he could smother him. Moreover, he could even follow up by breaking the tie-up with a followup hook.
And when Kalambay combined his smothering tactics with his upper-body movement, his defenses were sight to behold.
Sumbu Kalambay had been an incredible teacher; however, Mike McCallum was not just a student anymore. Teacher and student were now peers.
Stalemate
“This is no blood and thunder war, but in terms of technical skill and quality, this is a very, very fine fight indeed.”
The one thing Kalambay couldn’t do in both meetings was put his man on the backfoot. And McCallum, once he started meeting resistance, showed that he was not the same deer in the headlights as he was in the first bout. Instead of being overwhelmed, McCallum dug in his heels and chose to push back.
Kalambay’s bravery stepping in was a testament to his will to win, but McCallum put his namesake on display as he tore Kalambay’s ribs up as a vicious reminder where his home turf was.
Because Kalambay was stepping in frequently, McCallum chose to meet him with his own level change or intercepting shovel uppercuts to the body - the perfect way to punish an opponent with a lower base. He then built off of this level change with a ruthless, systemic dissection of Kalambay’s midsection. But that wasn’t all. McCallum would apply some new counters to keep his man on the retreat.
In particular, McCallum chose to use his left hook to not only prevent Kalambay from exchanging back on the inside, he would lever punch with it off of or into his body work. Kalambay had no choice but to reset and McCallum could resume his pursuit once more.
Weaponizing his reach advantage, McCallum would post with his left arm to keep his challenger moving backwards and set him up for his harder shot selections. On the ropes, it proved invaluable, especially behind frames. But its real purpose was to act as a workaround to Kalambay’s shoulder defense tactics. Although Kalambay could punch over McCallum’s arms when he framed, he would have to risk being closer and be exposed to more body shots.
To counteract Kalambay’s own pressure and proximity threats, McCallum would actively pull himself back and pivot behind his jab and a counter left hook to keep his momentum going if Kalamaby attempted to turn him or to command the directional battle.
What followed were rounds where every second mattered and, with peerless urgency, the champion and challenger fought like it. The adjustments, the countermeasures, the risks - the bout was being waged to the point that these aspects were seamless and nonstop. Neither fighter could stamp their authority without the other crafting a comeback moments later. The margins were too thin and both boxers were too good.
The fight reached its zenith at the end of the tenth where every single dynamic came into play in a blistering sequence of fighting:
1) McCallum’s measured pressure behind the jab and stiffarm posting is on display to pressure Kalambay.
2) Kalambay attempting to use his smothers and counter hooks to break the tie-ups and close the door on McCallum’s pressure while exhibiting incredible upper body defenses.
3) McCallum’s step-in body work and guard manipulation keeping Kalambay pinned consistently.
By the championship rounds, both men had exhausted their options, so old ideas were recycled or even taken from one another on the spot. Both would attempt to create a longer exchange with the jabs; they would step in behind level change counters; traps reestablished behind the jabs - in this sort of contest, everything was fair game.
Retrospective
Thirty-six minutes painted a picture for anyone watching: This one was too close to call. And, even upon rewatches, this is the exact sort of fight whereupon actually picking a winner seemed counterintuitive. Still, it took every ounce of his wits and the full extent of his skillset, but Mike McCallum had avenged his only ring defeat.
To those who’ve given their all to the fisticuffs, redemption isn’t a regularity. Whether it be that fighters are held within the predatory chain of matchmaking or their better simply has their number, losing can beget cruelty. That is, losing is looked down upon in combat sports - it is often a statistical value of condemnation. But I think the relationship between a loss and redemption has more to it.
Losing is a chance to reinforce perseverance. It’s a chance to reflect and rebuild - to try again. Attempting to redeem oneself from a loss though? Win or lose, you get the chance to prove how much your perseverance mattered.
Mike McCallum vs Sumbu Kalambay II did have a winner and loser, if only by a razor’s edge, yet no one who has seen this bout I feel would truly hold the results against the careers of both men. In the aftermath of his most haunting defeat, McCallum was given the chance to prove how special a fighter he really was by storming out of the gate and showing what one could argue was the most disciplined performance of his entire career. And, in his own defeat, Kalambay left his mark as one of his generation’s finest underachievers. As far as this writer is concerned, no one truly had Kalambay outskilled at his peak, but McCallum gave it as good an effort as anyone could. It was a technical masterpiece that could only have been waged between two of the finest the ring had ever seen.
Months later, Mike McCallum would meet the prestigious James Toney for a twelve-round draw that is marked as one of boxing’s prized showcases. The bout in question was magnificent and elevated both men’s standing. Perhaps controversially, however, I would argue that McCallum’s battle with Kalambay was every bit as good - and perhaps even better because it truly showed what two fighters at the peak of their powers could do.
As far as combat sports history goes, anyone would struggle to find many duels waged on this level.